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Abstract 
A still unsolved question is why humans create collectivism. New theory proposes that poorer 
populations coping with more demanding winters or summers become more collectivist. 
Preliminary support comes from a province-level analysis of survey data from 1662 native 
residents of 15 Chinese provinces. Collectivism is weakest in provinces with temperate 
climates irrespective of income (e.g., Guangdong), negligibly stronger in higher-income 
provinces with demanding climates (e.g., Hunan), and strongest in lower-income provinces 
with demanding climates (e.g., Heilongjiang). Multilevel analysis consolidates the results by 
demonstrating that collectivism at the provincial level fully mediates the interactive impact of 
climato-economic hardships on collectivist orientations at the individual level, suggesting that 
culture building is a collective top-down rather than bottom-up process. 
 
Keywords: collectivism, climatic demands, climato-economic, China, environmental livability 
 
Collectivism across China       3
Climato-Economic Imprints on Chinese Collectivism 
Chinese are more collectivist than most other populations on earth. This cultural trait is traced 
back predominantly to Confucian heritage (Bond & Hwang, 2008; Li, 1986; Nisbett, 2003). 
But Confucianism falls short in explaining why some Chinese are more collectivist than 
others. In Japan (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006), and in the United 
States (Kitayama, Conway, Pietromonaco, Park, & Plaut, 2010; Varnum & Kitayama, 2010), 
voluntary settlement patterns in frontier regions have created areas where present-day 
inhabitants are still more independent and less collectivist. However, China hardly has a 
history of voluntary settlement. Granted, China does have vast rural areas where inhabitants 
tend to be more collectivist than in urban areas (Freeman, 1997), and some Chinese may be 
more collectivist than others because of a greater parasitic disease burden (Fincher & 
Thornhill, 2012; Schaller & Murray, 2011), but single-factor explanations are seldom useful 
for understanding complex phenomena such as variation in collectivism (Georgas, Van de 
Vijver, & Berry, 2004; Van de Vliert & Postmes, 2012). 
This paper is the first attempt to map and explain geographic differences in the strength 
of collectivist orientations within the oldest and largest continuous civilization on earth. 
Going beyond single-factor explanations, we modify climatic determinism (for reviews, see 
Feldman, 1975; Sommers & Moos, 1976), we amend economic determinism (e.g., Inglehart 
& Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), and we surpass the ecocultural viewpoint that 
climatic and economic determinants have mutually independent effects on human functioning 
(Berry, 2011; Georgas et al., 2004). Instead, we set out to examine interactive impacts of 
climatic and economic hardships on collectivist orientations because income resources can 
help protect people against the broad misery of cold winters and hot summers (Van de Vliert, 
2009, 2011a). Across predominantly poor provinces of still relatively poor China, close 
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social-psychological ties with members of primary groups may be relatively important to 
successfully cope with the predominantly continental climate on a daily basis. 
Collectivists attach particular importance to the boundaries between ingroups and 
outgroups; emphasize their connectedness to the ingroups; and are primarily concerned with 
and motivated by the stresses, goals, means, and outcomes of members of their ingroups 
(Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004; Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1995; Van de Vliert, 
2013). The conceptual section gives an overview of why and how collectivist orientations 
may be influenced by climato-economic ecologies. We postulate three cumulative axioms as 
an explanatory foundation, propose climatic demands and income resources as interactive 
origins of variation in collectivism, review climato-economic covariations of collectivism that 
support the theory across nations, and apply the empirically supported theory to the Chinese 
case. The methods and results sections report a multilevel analysis of collectivist orientations 
of 1662 native residents from 15 climato-economically representative provinces across China. 
These within-country findings supplement preceding between-country observations in starting 
to unravel tangled and complex origins of collectivist orientations around the globe. 
Climato-Economic Theory of Culture 
Axioms: Needs, Demands and Resources 
The anthropologic needs axiom postulates that humans as a warm-blooded species have 
existential needs for thermal comfort, nutrition, and health, as exemplified by their natural 
inclination to seek residence in temperate climates away from arctics and deserts (Rehdanz & 
Maddison, 2005; Tavassoli, 2009; Van de Vliert, 2013, in press). 
The climatic demands axiom postulates that colder-than-temperate winters and hotter-





F) as a reference point for optimal psychophysiological comfort, abundant nutritional 
resources of flora and fauna, and healthy living conditions (Fischer & Van de Vliert, 2011; 
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Parsons, 2003; Van de Vliert, 2009). Greater climatic demands, due to decreasing natural 
resources, can be compensated for by increasing income resources. 
The economic resources axiom postulates that present-day humans use income resources 
to cope with demanding winters or summers. Liquid cash and illiquid capital can buy a wide 
variety of climate-compensating goods and services, including clothing, housing, heating and 
cooling, transportation, meals, and medical cure and care. Articulating the way this is visible 
in modern human beings, families in richer nations spend up to 50% of their household 
income on climate-compensating goods and services, a figure that rises over 90% in poorer 
nations (Parker, 2000, pp. 144-147). 
Demands-Resources Effects 
The climato-economic explanation of culture (Van de Vliert 2009, 2011a, 2013, in press) 
belongs to a family of demands-resources theories. Across the disciplines of psychology (e.g., 
Bandura, 1997; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Skinner & Brewer, 2002; Tomaka, Blascovich, 
Kibler, & Ernst, 1997), sociology (e.g., Ormel, Lindenberg, Steverink, & Vonkorff, 1997), 
and the organizational sciences (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Karasek, 1979), it is widely believed that 
demands placed on people are a double-edged sword. Greater demands in interaction with 
insufficient resources to meet the demands increase closed-mindedness and risk aversion, 
whereas greater demands in interaction with sufficient resources increase open-mindedness 
and risk seeking. Climato-economic theorizing similarly posits that climatic demands in 
interaction with poor income resources promote risk avoidance and looking for insurance 
through collectivistic seclusion and control, whereas climatic demands in interaction with rich 
income resources promote seeking better expected outcomes through individualistic 
exploration and creation. In other words, the expected utility of collectivist adaptation is 
higher in habitats with greater climatic and economic hardships. 
The climato-economic theory further proposes that inhabitants of lower-income areas 
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appraise more demanding winters and summers as threatening and adapt to them by falling 
back more on their ingroups for setting and achieving goals (collectivist orientation; Van de 
Vliert, 2011a, 2013; Van de Vliert & Postmes, 2012). Existential threats appear to set in 
motion processes of culture building in directions of closed-mindedness, ingroup 
commitment, and ingroup favoritism (Richter & Kruglanski, 2004). In a similar vein, the 
parasite-stress theory asserts that avoiding and managing life-threatening infections cultivate 
ingroup assortive sociality (Fincher & Thornhill, 2012; Fincher, Thornhill, Schaller, & 
Murray, 2008; Schaller & Murray, 2011). Gelfand et al. (2011) come closest to our demands-
resources notions by arguing and demonstrating that greater environmental threats and a 
greater dearth of resources promote cultural tightness with clearer norms and stronger 
sanctions for nonconformity, which are also highly characteristic of collectivist societies 
(Triandis, 1995). 
 The theory finally proposes that inhabitants of higher-income areas appraise more 
demanding winters and summers as challenging and adapt to them by falling back more on 
their individual selves for setting and achieving goals (individualist orientation; Van de Vliert, 
2011a, 2013). Only under relatively challenging environmental conditions “can people have a 
low enough need for closure to venture out on their own into the ambiguous, uncertain, and 
often risky realm of individualism” (Richter & Kruglanski, 2004, p. 116). This is the central 
idea also of the theory that voluntary settlement in challenging frontier regions promotes 
cultural values and practices of independence and self-reliance rather than collectivism 
(Kitayama et al., 2006, 2010; Varnum & Kitayama, 2010).   
Climato-Economic Covariations of Collectivism 
Comparative climato-economic studies of collectivism have been done for familism 
across 57 nations, nepotism across 116 nations, and compatriotism across 73 nations (Van de 
Vliert, 2011a). Because the results were highly similar, and because familism, nepotism and 
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compatriotism were indeed tapping the same underlying construct (Cronbach’s α = .89), the 
analysis was repeated predicting overall collectivism across 121 nations (Van de Vliert & 
Postmes, 2012). As predicted on the basis of threat appraisals versus challenge appraisals, 
greater climatic demands were associated with stronger collectivism in lower-income nations 
(e.g., Kyrgyzstan and Chad) but with weaker collectivism in higher-income nations (e.g., 
Finland and Bahrain). However, the validity of these findings can be critically questioned on 
the following grounds. 
One critical concern we have is for larger countries (e.g., China, Russia, and the United 
States) where climatic demands and income resources arguably span several climate and 
income zones. In addition, living with the nuclear family, nepotism and compatriotism are 
sociological outcomes rather than psychological manifestations of collectivism, and can be 
further criticized for assuming measurement equivalence across language boundaries and 
national borders (see Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of 
the above cross-national studies is that many alternative explanations of the findings can 
never be ruled out convincingly because countries differ in numerous characteristics. 
Although the potential impacts of parasitic disease burden, state antiquity, language diversity, 
ethnic heterogeneity, religious fractionalization, and being rooted in Christianity or Islam 
were statistically excluded (Van de Vliert, 2011a; Van de Vliert & Postmes, 2012), firm 
conclusions about the origins of geographic variation in collectivism do not yet exist. A 
replication study within a large country would reduce all of these concerns about averaging 
out climate and income variations, using sociological indicators, assuming psychometric 
equivalence, and overlooking alternative explanations.  
The Case of China 
China was chosen as an appropriate venue to better test the climato-economic covariation 
of collectivism because it has the climatic feature of large variations in cold winters and hot 
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summers, and the economic feature of poor areas in the north and the west and fast economic 
growth in some eastern provinces (The Economist, 2011). As most Chinese provinces have 
demanding continental climates and poor populations, overall livability will be appraised as 
threatening rather than challenging. For inhabitants of those habitats, the theory predicts that 
greater climatic demands are associated with stronger collectivist orientations in the poorest 
(henceforth lower-income) areas but that this tendency will be weaker in the moderately poor 
(henceforth higher-income) areas. Confirmation of that prediction would provide strong 
support for the validity of the climato-economic theory of culture as the predominantly 
collectivist Chinese cover only a limited range of the worldwide variation in the strength of 
collectivist versus individualist orientations. 
Method 
Sampling 
During 2008 and 2009, we sampled 15 Chinese provinces that differ in climate (temperate vs. 
demanding) and income per head (lower vs. higher), and are not significantly different from 
all provinces in these two respects (see below). As former colonies with distinct cultural 
histories, the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macao were left out of 
consideration. Within provinces, we concentrated on Han Chinese in order to standardize 
ethnicity. Even more specifically, we concentrated on Han Chinese as employees of medium-
sized enterprises in smaller towns to minimize the number of cross-provincial migrants. 
Achieving a 72.3% response rate, the final sample consisted of 972 males and 690 females 
working in 20 private-owned enterprises located in 20 towns across the 15 provinces (see 
Table 1 for details). The average age was 32, ranging from 18 to 65, 64.8% was married, and 
the average period of tenure was 8.55 years (SD = 8.17). Respondents were highly educated: 
53.6% completed high school, 24.8% received higher education of up-to-three years of 
college, and 26.6% held a bachelor’s or higher degree.  
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Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
Measures 
Individual level: Collectivist orientation. Using the common translation-back-translation 
procedure, a Chinese 14-item measure of that broad constellation of psychological attributes 
associated with collectivism was constructed on the basis of previously published instruments 
and reviews (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis et al., 
1986, 1993; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). To minimize acquiescence bias, 2 of the 14 items 
listed in Table 2 were reversely formulated and coded. Confirmatory factor analysis 
demonstrated a one-factor structure (χ2 = 606.84; df = 70; CFI = .90; IFI = .90; NFI = .89; GFI 
= .95; RMSEA = .06; standardized RMR = .06), producing an internally consistent score for 
collectivist orientation (Cronbach’s α = .74). 
Provincial level: Cultural collectivism. Collectivist orientations were measured assuming 
that the underlying construct generalizes across provinces. To check the validity of this 
assumption, we randomly chose Gansu as a reference group and compared the factor loadings 
of Gansu with those of the other provinces. Reflecting factorial similarity and construct 
equivalence across provinces, Tucker’s φ ranged from .85 in Hebei to .97 in Shanxi (Mφ = 
.91). Additionally, the reliability of the provincial means estimated by intraclass correlation 
was .88, the interrater agreement within provinces ranged from .82 to .97 (Mdn Rwg(j) = .93), 
and one-way analysis of variance indicated that cultural collectivism differed much more 
between provinces than within provinces (F = 8.66, df = 14, p < .001). These coefficients 
support the aggregation of collectivist orientations at the individual level into distinct 
estimates of cultural collectivism at the provincial level (see last column in Table 1).  
Provincial level: Climatic demands. In line with past research (e.g., Van de Vliert, 2009, 
2011a, 2011b), provincial climates are considered more demanding to the extent that 
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temperatures in the coldest and hottest months deviate from 22
°
C. Specifically, climatic 
demands were operationalized as the sum of the four absolute deviations from 22
°
C for the 
average lowest and highest temperatures in January and in July (data available for the capital 
city of each province from http://cdc.cma.gov.cn). In Heilongjiang, for example, the average 








C in July, 
so the climatic demands are | -24.6 – 22.0 | + | -13.0 – 22.0 | + | 18.0 – 22.0 | + | 27.7 – 22.0 | = 
91.3 (see Table 1 for the approximately normally distributed measures of climatic demands). 
There is no indication that the 15 provinces sampled do not represent all province-level 
regions with respect to the lowest (t = 0.01, ns) and highest (t = 0.18, ns) temperatures in 
January, and the lowest (t = 0.20, ns) and highest (t = 0.44, ns) temperatures in July. Nor is 
there any empirical indication that somewhat lower or higher reference points than 22
°
C lead 
to other results. 
Provincial level: Income resources. For each province, the average annual wage of 
employees in private-owned enterprises over the latest available year (2007) was taken from 
www.stats.gov.cn. The 15 indices listed in Table 1 are thought to be representative of all 
province-level parts of China (t = 0.06, ns). Income resources and climatic demands were 
insignificantly related predictors (r = -.40, n = 15, ns). 
Control variables. At the individual level, gender (1 = male; 2 = female), age, marital 
status (1 = not married; 2 = married), educational status (1 = below junior middle school; 5 = 
post-graduate and above), and professional status (1 = operational worker; 6 = top-level 
manager) served as control variables. At the provincial level, following Vandello and Cohen 
(1999, pp. 286-287), we controlled for population density (inhabitants per km
2
), and for the 
percentage of minorities, because both of these living conditions press “toward tightness and a 
need for coordination, hence collectivism.”  
Results 
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Zero-Order Correlations 
The well-documented tendency among Europeans and Americans that older people are 
more collectivist than younger people (for an overview, see Triandis, 2009), is replicated 
among Chinese individuals (see Table 3). Also, the cross-national observation that cultural 
collectivism is stronger in lower-income populations (Hofstede, 2001; Van de Vliert, 2011a), 
is replicated across Chinese provinces. Table 3 additionally shows that population density and 
percentage of minorities have negligible associations with cultural collectivism. By contrast, 
climatic demands and cultural collectivism are so strongly entwined (r = .80, n = 15, p < 
.001), that we first explored whether income resources can have any statistical effect on 
cultural collectivism over and above the extremely strong impact of climatic demands. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Preliminary Analysis 
We ran a regression analysis with standardized predictors at the provincial level to 
inspect both additive and interactive effects of climatic and economic hardships on 
collectivism. The results revealed that climatic demands (b = .06, ∆R2 = .64, p < .01), income 
resources (b = -.05, ∆R2 = .06, p < .05), and the interaction of climatic demands and income 
resources (b = -.06, ∆R2 = .15, p < .05), all had significant impacts, irrespective of whether or 
not population density and percentage of minorities were controlled for. As predicted, and as 
illustrated in Figure 1, cultural collectivism is positively influenced by climatic demands in 
lower-income provinces (simple slope test: b = .12, p < .01) but not in higher-income 
provinces (b = .01, ns). All 15 Cook’s Distances were below 1, indicating that there were no 
serious outliers; when Heilongjiang (D = .64) was removed from the analysis, main effects 
(two-tailed) and interaction effect (one-tailed) remained significant (p < .05).  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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Consolidating Analysis 
Concentrating on individuals, we next conducted a multilevel analysis with collectivist 
orientation as the dependent variable and climatic demands, income reources and their 
interaction as predictors. We also controlled for the effects of gender, age, marital status, 
educational status and professional status at the individual level, and population density and 
minority percentage at the provincial level. The results showed that, apart from population 
density (b = .03, p < .05), none of the control variables had a significant effect on collectivist 
orientation. By contrast, climatic demands (b = .07, p < .01), income resources (b = -.03, p < 
.05), and their interaction (b = -.04, p < .05) all reached significance, predicting an extra 7.3% 
of the individual-level variation. However, when cultural collectivism at the provincial level 
was then entered into the equation, it appeared to be the only significant predictor (b = .11, p 
< .01), accounting for 17.3% of the individual-level variation in total. Consolidating and 
extending the results of the preliminary analysis, these findings imply that collectivism at the 
provincial level fully mediates the interactive impact of climatic and economic hardships on 
collectivist orientation at the individual level (see Table 4 for detailed results). 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Supplementary Analysis 
The above analyses neglect the “psychological geography” (Rentfrow, in press) of 
Chinese collectivism by neglecting the couplings between collectivist orientations and 
provincial locations. Cultural orientations and geographic locations can be coupled in 
descriptive and predictive ways (Lobao, Hooks, & Tickamyer, 2007; Van de Vliert, 2011a, 
2013). In our case, descriptive coupling results in a map of observed cultural collectivism 
across 15 provinces resting on a single data point for each of the 15 provinces studied. 
Predictive coupling, by contrast, results in a map of estimated cultural collectivism across all 
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provinces whose climato-economic conditions can be used to make theory-based guesses 
about each province’s position in the cloud of all 15 data points for provincial collectivism. 
For three reasons, we used the regression equation from the preliminary analysis to 
estimate cultural collectivism across 31 provinces. First, the climato-economic conditions in 
the sample of 15 provinces are an approximately adequate representation of the climato-
economic conditions in all 31 provinces for which climatic demands and wages in private-
owned enterprises are available for analysis (see t tests in the method section; 
www.stats.gov.cn does not provide income data for Hong Kong and Macao). Second, the 15 
provincial measures of cultural collectivism are highly reliable (see interrater agreement and 
intraclas correlation in the method section), not in the least because aggregation of individual-
level orientations to the provincial level reduces measurement error by smoothing out 
personal idiosyncracies. Third, climato-economic conditions appear to accurately predict 
province-level variation in cultural collectivism (R
2 
= .85; see preliminary analysis). 
These considerations of sample representativeness, measurement reliability, and 
predictive accuracy provided methodological grounds for predicting the strength of cultural 
collectivism in 31 province-level regions across China. Table 5 reports the 31 estimated 
baseline scores in descending order, the regression equation on which they are based, and the 
15 observed baseline scores with which they may be compared. Further emphasizing the 
accuracy of the prediction model, visual inspection reveals that the predicted and the observed 
baselines in the sample provinces are almost identical (r = .89, n = 15, p < .001). The display 
of regional patterns of cultural collectivism in Figure 2 shows that collectivist orientations 
tend to be weakest in the south, moderately weak to moderately strong in China’s heartlands, 
and strongest in the north. 
Insert Table 5 and Figure 2 about here 
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Discussion 
Theoretical Implications 
Scientific progress. The novel insight that the interaction of climatic and economic 
hardships leads humans to jointly create mutually shared collectivism goes beyond purely 
economic explanations of collectivist cultures (e.g., Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005). Moreover, this interactive explanation goes beyond additive effects of climatic 
and economic conditions on human functioning advocated by adherents of the ecocultural 
framework (e.g., Berry, 2011; Georgas et al., 2004). Most importantly, the support we found 
for the covariation of ecological hardships and collectivism also goes beyond earlier work on 
the climato-economic origins of collectivism (Van de Vliert, 2009, 2011a, 2013; Van de 
Vliert & Postmes, 2012) in three salient ways. 
First, climato-economic imprints on Chinese collectivism reduce criticisms of cross-
national support for climato-economic theorizing. These criticisms concern measurement 
errors in averages for large countries, sociological indicators of collectivism, and 
psychometric equivalence across distinct populations. There are also fewer confounding 
variables affecting cross-provincial findings than confounding variables affecting cross-
national findings. Second, no preceding research has provided such a stringent and 
conservative test of the climato-economic theory of collectivist culture within a carefully 
sampled geographic area. Third, this is the first study ever to compare climato-economic 
impacts on individual-level collectivist orientation and higher-level collectivist culture. The 
finding that collectivism at the provincial level fully mediates the interactive impact of 
climatic and economic hardships on collectivist orientation at the individual level suggests 
that culture building is a collective process. Apparently, exposed to the same winters, 
summers, and financial standard of living, populations are gradually pushing and pulling 
every member toward a shared culture—a top-down rather than bottom-up process. 
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Chinese collectivism is often traced back to Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (Bond 
& Hwang, 2008; Li, 1986; Nisbett, 2003). There is little doubt that these philosophical-
religious traditions have influenced stresses, goals, means, and outcomes in contemporaneous 
China. Additionally, it is also likely that Chinese are no exception to the rule that millennia-
long evolution of collectivist culture in humans, just like evolution in animals and plants, has 
climatic underpinnings (Van de Vliert & Postmes, 2012). So perhaps it should have come as 
no surprise that we discovered climate-collectivism links, that collectivism at the provincial 
level and through it collectivist orientations at the individual level are positively associated 
with climatic demands. However, these climate-collectivism links are influenced by the 
financial standard of living: collectivism is weakest in provinces with temperate climates 
irrespective of income (e.g., Guangdong), negligibly stronger in higher-income provinces 
with demanding climates (e.g., Hunan), and strongest in lower-income provinces with 
demanding climates (e.g., Heilongjiang). 
Theoretical consolidation: Population density. “When the number of people per unit of 
area is large, people have to develop many rules for social behavior to reduce the probability 
of conflict … Population density presses toward tightness, hence collectivism” (Triandis, 
1995, pp. 58, 100). The evidence for this hypothesis is becoming stronger and stronger. Cross-
nationally, societies with higher population density are tighter and more collectivist (Gelfand 
et al., 2011). Similarly, within the United States, higher density of population, which should 
not be confused with greater urbanism, is associated with stronger collectivism (Vandello & 
Cohen, 1999). Our study now adds that Chinese subpopulations, too, are more collectivist in 
more densily populated areas. All in all, the positive link between population density and 
cultural collectivism robustly holds across nations (Gelfand et al, 2011), across regions within 
a relatively rich country, which is home to the largest individualist civilization on earth 
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(Vandello & Cohen, 1999), and across regions within a relatively poor country, which is 
home to the largest collectivist civilization on earth (this study). 
Theoretical application: Percentage of minorities. While we defined collectivists on the 
basis of the importance attached to the boundaries between ingroups and outgroups, so far we 
highlighted membership of ingroups, leaving non-membership of outgroups in the 
background. This one-sided emphasis, however, ignores the fact that the climato-economic 
theory of culture can be used to further clarify the causal order of ingroup loyalty and 
outgroup antagonism in explaining intergroup conflict. “Findings from both cross-cultural 
research and laboratory experiments” now seem to support the hypothesis “that much ingroup 
bias and intergroup discrimination is motivated by preferential treatment of ingroup members 
rather than direct hostility toward outgroup members” (Brewer, 1999, p. 429; see also Brewer 
& Chen, 2007). If negative outgroup discrimination is, in many cases, an epiphenomenon of 
positive ingroup discrimination, it follows that a better understanding of intergroup conflict, 
and especially of interethnic violence in China, must be primarily sought in ultimate sources 
of ingroup loyalty. 
For example, this study might shed extra light on the age-old quarrels, scuffles, and fights 
between Uighur people of Turkic Muslim descent and Han Chinese inhabiting Xinjiang 
(www1.american.edu/ted/ice/xinjiang.htm). Of course, these intergroup conflicts have deep 
historical roots and are created and maintained through sociostructural and psychological 
factors. But how sure are we that remote ecological origins cannot trigger off or complicate a 
causal trajectory leading to ingroup loyalty and outgroup antagonism? Xinjiang has a 
demanding continental climate with very cold winters and very hot summers, and economic 
inequality between lower-income Uighurs and higher-income Han Chinese. These climato-
economic circumstances in Xinjiang predict that the Uighurs will attach more importance to 
the boundaries between themselves and the Han Chinese than vice versa. If ingroup love 
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drives outgroup hate, climato-economic circumstances in Xinjiang further predict that the 
Uighurs will discriminate and confront the Han Chinese rather than the other way round, 
although retaliatory actions by the Han Chinese may sometimes suggest otherwise. 
Mutatis mutandis, the same hypotheses apply to the inhabitants of the Tibetan roof of the 
world with its cold winters and income inequality between citizens of Mongoloid blood and 
Han Chinese. These climato-economic circumstances predict that positive ingroup 
discrimination and negative outgroup discrimination will both be stronger among Mongoloid 
Tibetans than among local Han Chinese. If these hypotheses about interethnic relations in 
Xinjiang and Tibet hold true after attempts to prove them wrong, the proposition that climatic 
hardships trigger conflict (e.g., Burke, Miguel, Satyanath, Dykema, & Lobell, 2009; Lee, 
2009; Tol & Wagner, 2010; Welzer, 2012; Zhang, Jim, Lin, He, Wang, & Lee, 2006) can be 
refined into the proposition that climato-economic hardships trigger conflict (e.g., Van de 
Vliert, 2011b; Van de Vliert, Van der Vegt, & Janssen, 2009). 
Theoretical generalization. Because the explanation of collectivism in terms of climatic 
demands  and income resources belongs to a family of demands-resources theories, as 
outlined above, it is pertinent to also ask to what extent the present findings reflect a more 
general reality. Is the mechanism of meeting environmental demands through using income 
resources generalizable from threatening winters and summers to other threatening 
circumstances? Moving us further beyond single-factor determinism, it may be an innovative 
avenue for future research to examine whether there are social-psychological adaptations to 
interactions of income and demandingness of, for example, natural disasters, food deprivation, 
disease prevalence, population density, domestic political violence, or territorial threats from 
neighboring nations. If the climato-economic explanation of collectivism survives tests 
against these alternative demands-resources interactions, one next question is how climato-
economic habitats are related to evolutionary processes. 
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Evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Baumeister, 2005; Buss, 2005; Plotkin, 2002; 
Yamagishi, 2011) may read the empirical results reported here as extra evidence for the 
validity of models of biotic niche construction within predominantly abiotic habitats. Cash 
and capital were gradually constructed as ingenious tools that exist independently of place, 
time, and items they can buy. In turn, these tools are now intensively used to collectively 
shape the environment by altering direct and indirect impacts of adverse winters and summers 
on meeting shared existential needs. All of these niche-construction activities lead to new 
feedback cycles and become the basis for continuous further adaptation, including gradual 
moves from collectivist to individualist orientations. 
Methodological Considerations 
The strength of conservative testing of climato-economic imprints on collectivism in the 
Chinese context came with the weakness of convenient access to only 15 out of the 31 
province-level regions. The strength of homogeneous sampling of Han Chinese employed 
with medium-sized enterprises in smaller towns came with the weakness of leaving non-
employed people, self-employed entrepreneurs with small enterprises, and farmers out of 
consideration. The strength of using multilevel analysis came with the weakness of analyzing 
cross-level data to tackle the basically longitudinal problem of collectivist adaptation (for 
longitudinal evidence across nations, see Van de Vliert, 2011a). 
Likely Changes in China 
Our measures and messages are not about global warming, nor about culture change. 
Nevertheless, the climato-economic covariations of collectivism found may be bound to have 
implications for the cultural consequences of global warming in the long run, which charges 
us with the ethical obligation to mention these implications (Swim et al., 2011; Doherty & 
Clayton, 2011). On the basis of data generated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Cline (2007) has forecasted temperature changes in China’s seven climatic subzones 
Collectivism across China       19
between the end of the 20th century (1961-1990) and the end of the 21st century (2070-2099). 
His global warming projections, broken down for winter months and summer months, imply 
that climatic demands will decrease all over China, but especially in a diagonal slice of 
provinces and counties stretching from the Tibetan plateau in the southwest through Central 
China to Heilongjiang in the northeast. 
Thus, during the current century, climatic demands are expected to decrease relatively 
strongly for Chinese living in regions with continental climates where collectivism is still 
relatively strong (cf. Figure 2). To the extent that our findings, pictured in Figure 1, reflect 
causality rather than cross-sectional simultaneity, especially collectivism around this 
southwest-northeast diagonal is bound to weaken in times to come. Figure 1 also suggests that 
economic growth will reinforce the link between weakening climatic demands and weakening 
collectivism. Indeed, the present findings propose, at least for China to begin with, that 
decreases in climato-economic hardships and decreases in collectivism are in flux together.
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Table 1 
Sample Composition, Climatic Demands, Income Resources, and Cultural Collectivism for 15 Chinese Provinces 
 Number of towns 
and organizations 
n = 20 
Number of 
participants 









North and Northeast China 
Shanxi  2 140  65.8 14,141 3.58 
Hebei 1 101 57.8 12,443 3.61 
Heilongjiang 2 184  91.3 10,779 3.86 
East China 
Shandong 1 94  56.2 15,636 3.64 
Zhejiang 1 55 49.0 25,462 3.51 
Jiangxi 1 101  48.5 12,574 3.55 
Fujian  1 85  36.6 18,853 3.50 
Central and Southeast China 
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Henan  1 92  53.9 15,850 3.60 
Hubei 1 57  50.5 12,921 3.63 
Hunan 2 262  48.5 16,071 3.58 
Guangdong 2 119  29.9 16,328 3.48 
Southwest China 
Guizhou 2 158  41.6 16,893 3.57 
Sichuan  1 74 39.7 15,176 3.41 
Northwest China 
Gansu 1 73  66.6 12,979 3.61 
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Table 2 
Items in the order of descending factor loadings on collectivist orientation 
  
Item (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
Factor 
loading 
I view myself as a member of a social group .65 
If I have done an excellent job, I attribute my success to collective effort .60 
It is my duty to defend the reputation of my organization .59 
As an employee, I have to respect decisions made by my organization .55 
The happiness of those who are closely related to me is more important than my 
own happiness 
.50 
What is good for my organization is also good for me .47 
Having harmonious relationships with colleagues is my path to success .43 
The most important thing in my life is to have good friends and easygoing 
colleagues 
.42 
My close interpersonal relationships reflect who I am .39 
In the workplace, disagreement should be avoided because it damages harmonious 
relationships with colleagues 
.37 
My work success depends more on networks and relationships than on my own 
abilities and efforts 
.36 
I cannot think of myself without relating myself to close friends and family .28 
I never rely on my friends and colleagues to help me out with difficulties (reversed)     -.25 
If the group is slowing me down, it is better to leave it and work alone (reversed)     -.30 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix for Variables at the Individual Level and at the Provincial Level 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
Chinese Individuals (n = 1662)      
1. Collectivist orientation —     
2. Gender -.01 —    
3. Age    .16
**
   .10
**
 —   




    .53
**
 —  




 .03  -.16
**
 — 
6. Professional status .01 .07
*




   .41
**
 
Chinese Provinces (n = 15)      
1. Cultural collectivism —     
2. Population density -.23 —    
3. Percentage of minorities .10  -.53
*
 —   




 .35 —  
5. Income resources -.50
*
 .34 .15 -.36 — 
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Table 4 
Multilevel Model Testing: Effects of Climatic Demands and Income Resources on Collectivist 
Orientation at the Individual Level (N = 1662 Participants Nested in 15 Provinces) 










Control variables: Individual level 





(.02)   .04
 
(.02)   .04
 
(.02) 
Marital status  .01 (.02)  .01 (.01)  .01 (.01)  .01 (.01) 
Educational status -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02) 
Professional status  .01 (.02)  .01 (.02)  .01 (.02)  -.01 (.02) 
Control variables: Provincial level 
Population density -.04 (.03)  .01 (.02)    .03
* 
(.01)    -.01
 
(.02) 
Percentage of minorities - .01 (.03) -.01 (.01)   .02
 




Climatic demands (CD)    .09
** 













CD * IR   -.04
* 
(.01)       .01
 
(.02) 
Mediator: Provincial level   
  
Cultural collectivism     .11
** 
(.03) 
χ2 1381.66 1361.48 1352.52 1342.14 
∆χ2  211.52** 20.18** 8.96** 10.38** 
R1
2 
.095 .145 .168 .173 
Note.   In the null model, the value of the intercept is 3.58, p < .01; χ2 = 1593.18. Values in brackets 
refer to Standardized Errors. 
* 
p < .05.   
** 
p < .01. 
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Table 5 
Estimated and Observed Baselines of Cultural Collectivism for 31 Climato-Economic 
Regions of China 
Rank 
Province-level 





  Cultural collectivism 
  Estimated Observed 
    1 Heilongjiang  91.3 10,779  3.927 3.86 
    2 Jilin  83.7 11,135  3.858  
    3 Liaoning  74.4 12,242  3.763  
    4 Inner Mongolia  79.7 14,338  3.737  
    5 Qinghai  69.9 13,228  3.713  
    6 Gansu  66.6 12,979  3.699 3.61 
    7 Shanxi  65.8 14,141  3.673 3.58 
    8 Tibet  59.2 11,770  3.672  
    9 Hebei  57.8 12,443  3.654 3.61 
  10 Xinjiang  84.2 17,780  3.644 3.61 
  11 Shaanxi  53.8 11,289  3.640  
  12 Shandong  56.2 15,636  3.608 3.64 
  13 Hubei  50.5 12,921  3.605 3.63 
  14 Henan  53.9 15,850  3.597 3.60 
  15 Jiangxi  48.5 12,574  3.596 3.55 
  16 Anhui  50.9 15,340  3.590  
  17 Hunan  48.5 16,071  3.576 3.58 
  18 Jiangsu  51.2 18,837  3.565  
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  19 Beijing  61.0 20,379  3.557  
  20 Chongqing  41.6 15,149  3.552  
  21 Guizhou  40.1 16,893  3.547 3.57 
  22 Sichuan  39.7 15,176  3.544 3.41 
  23 Fujian  36.6 18,853  3.543 3.50 
  24 Zhejiang  49.0 25,462  3.523 3.51 
  25 Yunnan  34.5 14,054  3.517  
  26 Tianjin  59.5 23,465  3.514  
  27 Guangdong  29.9 16,328  3.512 3.48 
  28 Guangxi  31.5 14,266  3.503  
  29 Shanghai  48.2 30,923  3.497  
  30 Ningxia  71,1 25,362  3.448  
  31 Hainan  22.9 12,069  3.431  
Note.   Baselines were estimated (Sest = .02) using the following regression equation: 
CC = 3.60 + (.06 x CD) + (-.05 x IR) + (-.06 x CD x IR), where CC is cultural collectivism, 
CD is standardized climatic demands, and IR is standardized income resources.  
























Figure 1. Effect of climatic demands on cultural collectivism at the provincial level, 
broken down for lower-income and higher-income provinces. 
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Figure 2. Regional patterns of cultural collectivism in China. 
